Surrogate End of Life Decisionmaking: The Importance of Providing Procedural Due Process, a Case Review by Tucker, Kathryn L.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 72 Number 3 
7-1-1997 
Surrogate End of Life Decisionmaking: The Importance of 
Providing Procedural Due Process, a Case Review 
Kathryn L. Tucker 
University of Washington School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
Digital 
Commons 
Network 
Logo 
 Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kathryn L. Tucker, Essay, Surrogate End of Life Decisionmaking: The Importance of Providing Procedural 
Due Process, a Case Review, 72 Wash. L. Rev. 859 (1997). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol72/iss3/4 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. 
For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright o 1997 by Washington Law Review Association
SURROGATE END OF LIFE DECISIONMAKING:
THE IMPORTANCE OF PROVIDING PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS, A CASE REVIEW
Kathryn L. Tucker*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a hospital in the State of Washington, at the direction of family-
member surrogates, the feeding tube was withdrawn from a resident
patient.! The patient had no advance directive or living will, nor had he
expressed the desire (previously or contemporaneously) for withdrawal
of life support. He had not been diagnosed as terminally ill or
permanently unconscious. In fact, there was evidence that the patient had
some cognitive function, desired to continue living, and desired
continued life support. This evidence was presented to his caregivers
immediately after the patient was advised of the withdrawal, yet life
support was not resumed until five days later, and only after a court so
ordered.
What happened to this patient raises fundamental questions about the
procedures to be followed before life support is withdrawn from a patient
who has not made an advance directive, the safeguards for ascertaining a
patient's condition and wishes, and the situations in which a surrogate
may direct life-support removal. May hospitals and doctors terminate life
support at the direction of a surrogate without assurance that the patient
(a) is terminally ill or permanently unconscious, and (b) cannot make and
express his or her own decision whether to live or die? Are procedural
safeguards defined solely by hospitals' and doctors' standards of care, or
must they include standards articulated by the state's highest court?
* Ms. Tucker represented the patient through a guardian in the case discussed herein. Ms. Tucker
was also counsel in both of the federal constitutional challenges which asserted that competent,
terminally-ill patients have a constitutionally protected right to choose physician assistance in dying.
See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110, 1997 WL 348094 (U.S. June 26, 1997); Quill v. Vacco, 80
F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, No. 95-1858, 1997 WL 348037 (U.S. June 26, 1997). Ms. Tucker is
Affiliate Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law and practices law with
Seattle-based Perkins Coie.
The author wishes to recognize the great courage and tenacity of the patient's former spouse, who
worked to ensure that the patient's wishes be known and respected, notwithstanding the patient's
disability.
1. The identities of the patient, surrogates, hospital, and physicians, as they are irrelevant to a
discussion of the issues presented herein, are not disclosed.
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The case discussed here reveals that a wide chasm exists between the
requirements of Washington state law2 and mediced practice. By
operating without following the procedures established by the state's
supreme court, medical practice has descended far down a slippery slope,
permitting surrogates to direct life-support withdrawal from incompetent
or questionably competent patients who are neither terminally ill nor
permanently unconscious. This state of affairs should be of grave
concern to all concerned with end of life decisionmaking.
II. BACKGROUND
The patient was a healthy, active man until he suffered a stroke that
left him severely disabled at age thirty-seven. He regained some
cognitive and communicative function following his stroke. He primarily
communicated through eye movement, including the eye blink method
and use of an eye gaze board.3 Two years after the initial stroke, his care
providers had conflicting views regarding whether his communicative
ability or cognitive function had diminished or ended.
The patient's father and sister, who had been appointed his temporary
guardians by a state court, requested, in their capacity as surrogate
decisionmakers, that the patient's life support be withdrawn. The
patient's life support consisted of food and liquid provided through a
feeding tube implanted in his stomach.
Following receipt of the surrogates' request, one of the attending
physicians ordered a neurological evaluation. The neurologist performed
a single examination and concluded that the patient was "chronic
vegetative." This term does not indicate, nor was it intended by this
2. Withdrawal of life support at the request of a surrogate is governed by common law and the
Constitutions of Washington and the United States. The Washington Legislatare has not addressed
the subject. The Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979 and amended in 1992, co~ers withdrawal of life
support from incompetent patients who have executed written instructions on the subject prior to loss
of competency. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.122.010-.920 (1996). The Act dc.es not apply absent a
written directive. See In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), amended
by 757 P.2d 534 (1988). In discussing such a situation, the Grant court stated:
We note at the outset that this State's Natural Death Act is inapplicable. 'The act authorizes a
competent adult to sign a directive requiring that lifesustaining treatment be withheld or
withdrawn should he or she suffer from a terminal and incurable condition. As [the patient] was
adjudicated incompetent at age 14, she was unable to avail herself of the act'"; provisions.
Id. at 553, 747 P.2d at 449 (citations omitted).
3. Communication by eye movement is a method commonly used with stroke survivors who have
lost the ability to move and speak. For a moving memoir of a woman who suffered a stroke and
required this method of communication, see Julia Tavalaro & Richard Tayson, Look Up for Yes
(1997).
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doctor to indicate, a permanent loss of consciousness.4 No other
neurologist or nonattending physician examined the patient to determine
his medical condition. Neither of his two attending physicians had
diagnosed the patient as vegetative. The patient was not terminally ill.
The hospital's Ethics Committee considered the surrogates' request
and the neurologist's findings and voted to approve the withdrawal. Life
support was then withdrawn. At the time life support was withdrawn, the
patient had not been determined to be either terminally ill or permanently
unconscious by any physician. No prognosis committee confirmed that
he was either permanently unconscious or terminally ill prior to the
withdrawal.'
The patient had been married and divorced prior to his stroke and had
remained good friends with his former spouse.' His former spouse visited
him regularly and communicated with him, and he communicated with
her, as with others, through eye blinks or movements.
The former spouse was not involved in the decision to terminate life
support; she received an express mail letter from the guardians advising
her that the feeding tube had been withdrawn the day before. She visited
the patient immediately to discuss the withdrawal. She perceived that the
patient communicated a desire for continued life support. She sought to
effectuate his wishes, first by alerting hospital staff and his guardians,
and then, this proving futile, by invoking judicial assistance. One of the
patient's nurses also believed that she had observed the patient
communicate his desire for continued life support. The nurse
documented this in the patient's medical chart. However, life support
was not resumed until five days later, and only after a court order was
obtained by the former spouse.
The patient survived this withdrawal of life support. In a later
guardianship proceeding, the former spouse obtained court authorization
to maintain a tort action on the patient's behalf against the medical
providers who had terminated his life support. The plaintiff sought a
pretrial ruling that state law required minimum procedural protections to
be afforded the patient prior to removal of life support at the direction of
4. This neurologist explained at deposition and trial that her use of the term "chronic vegetative"
meant that the patient appeared vegetative on the occasion of the exam, but that she had not formed
an opinion as to whether the patient's condition was transient, reversible, or permanent.
5. A "prognosis committee" consists of two nonattending physicians with relevant qualifications.
See In re welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 134-35, 660 P.2d 738, 749-50 (1983), modified by
In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
6. The former spouse was the only friend or family member who lived in Washington State. She
had far more contact with the patient than did his out-of-state friends and relatives.
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surrogates,7 and that these minimum procedural protections defined
defendants' minimum standard of care. The motion was denied. The
court refused to find that case law imposed such requirements on medical
care providers. The case was then tried to a jury. The judge refused to
instruct the jury that the law imposed any such requirements on the
medical providers. The jury returned a defense verdict. The patient died
before his appeal could be reviewed; the appeal was therefore dismissed
as moot.
III. DID THE PATIENT'S DOCTORS OWE HIM A DUTY TO
PROVIDE CERTAIN MINIMUM PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS PRIOR TO REMOVAL OF LIFE SUPPORT?
On three occasions prior to the events in this case, the Washington
Supreme Court considered the matter of withdrawal of life support from
patients at the request of surrogates.8 In each instance the Court held that
certain minimum procedural protections must be afforded patients for
whom medical decisions on this life-or-death matter are made by
surrogates. This makes sense. Citizens may not take each other's lives,
except in rare circumstances authorized by the State. Absent
authorization, such actions are criminal. The State may not authorize the
taking of life (or liberty or property) without due process, and the process
that is due depends on the stakes involved and the chances of error. No
stakes are higher than when a human life is at issue, and the chances of
error are high when the issue is knowing what is going on inside the
mind of a person disabled from speaking, writing, or madng almost any
7. See infra Part uIl.
8. See In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), amended by 757
P.2d 534 (1988); Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 810, 689 P.2d at 1372; Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 134-35,
660 P.2d at 749-50.
In its only decision addressing withdrawal of life support from a patient at the request of a
surrogate, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that it will defer to the states on the question of what
procedural requirements must be met. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
The Court recognized that although there is a constitutional liberty interest in b.-ing free of unwanted
life-sustaining treatment, a state's requirement that a patient's wishes favoring withdrawal be
established by clear and convincing evidence was permissible. Id. at 279. This is so because the
Supreme Court deemed the decision regarding this end-of-life issue to be so personal to the
individual patient that efforts to prevent error and the usurpation of the patient's wishes must be
upheld. Id. at 281.
Washington has opted for a less restrictive standard than that which was at issue in Cruzan. It is
permissible to remove life support in Washington without meeting the rigorous evidentiary standard
required by Missouri. However, a lesser standard should not be randomly or carelessly applied.
Careful and rigorous implementation is necessary, lest this enormously persor al matter be wrongly
decided. To do less would be inconsistent with the principles recognized in Cruzan.
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movement. The Washington Supreme Court has thus repeatedly honored
the common-sense and constitutional proposition that a patient's life may
be terminated only if he or she is surely terminal or permanently
vegetative and either has made such a choice known in advance or is
unable to make a choice.
In the first of the Washington cases addressing this issue, In re
Welfare of Colyer,9 the court considered whether Bertha Colyer's
husband could direct the removal of her life support after she was
determined to be in a vegetative state following a heart attack and
deprivation of oxygen to her brain for an extended period of time. After
reviewing case law of other states, which evidenced a trend in favor of
patient autonomy, the Washington Supreme Court stated: "[W]e now
hold that an adult who is incurably and terminally ill has a constitutional
right of privacy that encompasses the right to refuse treatment that serves
only to prolong the dying process."'0
The court considered at length the condition in which the patient must
be prior to the withdrawal of life support and stated that there must be a
"medical determination that the patient is incurable and will not return to
a sapient state."" This determination was found to be a medical one that
"must also incorporate safeguards."'" The court specifically considered
whether an ethics committee would be an appropriate and sufficient
safeguard and determined that it would not be. 3 "In actuality, what is
needed is a prognosis board to confirm the attending physician's
diagnosis. Concurrence by professional colleagues who are not attending
physicians but who nonetheless have an understanding of the patient's
condition would protect against erroneous diagnoses as well as
questionable motives."' 4 Accordingly, the court directed that the
following procedure be employed: "[W]e recommend that in future
decisions of this nature, there should be unanimous concurrence from a
prognosis board or committee. Such a committee should consist of no
fewer than two physicians with qualifications relevant to the patient's
condition, plus the attending physician."'" The Colyer court permitted the
withdrawal of treatment because such procedural protections had in fact
9. In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 134-35, 660 P.2d 738, 749-50 (1983), modifled by
In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
10. Id. at 120, 660 P.2d at 742.
11. Id. at 133-34, 660 P.2d at 749.
12. Id. at 134, 660 P.2d at 749.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citation omitted).
15. Id. at 134-35, 660 P.2d at 749.
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been met: that is, two nontreating, qualified physicians had agreed that
Bertha Colyer was incurable and would never recover to a sapient state.
16
In the second case, In re Guardianship of Hamlin,17 the Washington
Supreme Court considered withdrawal of life support from Joseph
Hamlin, who had suffered cardio-respiratory arrest and lack of oxygen to
his brain for an extended period of time, causing him to become
irreversibly vegetative. In Mr. Hamlin's case, the attending physician
diagnosed him as vegetative, and this diagnosis was confirmed by "at
least twenty physicians.""8 The court applied Colyer, star:ing, "In Colyer,
we established a set of procedural guidelines to follow in future cases
involving the withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment from
an incompetent patient."'9 Hamlin eliminated the Colyer requirement that
there be a guardianship hearing prior to the withdrawal." The Hamlin
court stated that the additional procedural protection of a guardianship
proceeding was unnecessary:
We are convinced that the remaining procedural safeguards
surrounding this decision will adequately protect against abuse.
First, this decision can be reached only after there is a medical
diagnosis by the attending physicians that (1) the incompetent
patient is in a persistent vegetative state with no reasonable chance
of recovery and (2) the patient's life is being maintained by life
.support systems.... Second, this initial diagnosis must be
unanimously approved by the prognosis committee.2'
The third in this trilogy of Washington decisions adchessing at length
the matter of withdrawal of a patient's life support at the direction of a
16. Id. at 131-35, 660 P.2d at 748-50.
17. 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
18. Id. at 814, 689 P.2d at 1375 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 816, 689 P.2d at 1376 (emphasis added). The court noted that in Mr. Hamlin's case, no
prognosis committee per se was convened because the situation arose prior to the Colyer decision.
Id. at 817, 689 P.2d at 1376. However, the court took pains to note that there was consensus among
all of the more than twenty physicians that Hamlin was irreversibly vegetative. It is noteworthy that,
notwithstanding unanimous confirmation of Hamlin's irreversibly vegetative condition by so many
doctors, the hospital sought judicial authorization prior to withdrawing treatment. In contrast, in the
case discussed herein, with only a single disinterested physician's diagnosis of a "chronic"
vegetative state, the care providers withdrew the patienfs life support.
20. Id. at 818-20, 689 P.2d at 1377-78.
21. Id. at 819, 689 P.2d at 1378 (emphasis added). See also In re Guardianship of Ingram, 102
Wash. 2d 827, 835, 689 P.2d 1363, 1367 (1984) (recognizing that Hamlin esttblished that if treating
physicians, prognosis committee, and appointed guardian all agreed, life support could be withdrawn
without judicial involvement).
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surrogate is In re Guardianship of Grant.'2 In Grant, the patient was not
vegetative but, rather, was terminally ill. Thus, the Washington Supreme
Court considered for the first time whether it was permissible to permit a
surrogate to direct the withholding of life-sustaining treatment to a
terminally ill, nonvegetative, but incompetent person. The Grant court
held that it was permissible, provided that certain minimum procedural
requirements were followed:
We hold that prior court authorization to withhold life sustaining
treatment shall not be required where all the following
circumstances are present:
1. The incompetent patient's attending physician, together with
two other physicians qualified to assess the patient's condition,
determine with reasonable medical judgment that the patient is in
an advanced stage of a terminal and incurable illness and is
suffering severe and permanent mental and physical deterioration.'
The procedural requirements articulated in Grant were consistent with
those established in Colyer, recognized and reaffirmed in Hamlin: at a
minimum, the patient whose life support is to be withdrawn at the
request of a surrogate must be diagnosed by the attending physician(s) as
either terminally ill or irreversibly vegetative, and such diagnosis must
then be confirmed by no fewer than two disinterested physicians with
relevant qualifications. Thus, although the Grant court did not
specifically employ the term "prognosis board," it in no way suggested
that previously enunciated requirements were in any way lessened or
eliminated, particularly as regards apparently vegetative patients.24 Had
the court intended to overrule, or lessen in any way, such important
minimum procedural protections as were recently established in its two
earlier cases, it would have done so explicitly and with explanation.'
That Washington requires both a prerequisite condition (either
irreversible unconsciousness or terminal illness) and confirmation of that
22. 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), amended by 757 P.2d 534 (1988).
23. Id. at 566, 747 P.2d at 456 (emphasis added). The additional procedural requirements of Grant
were not at issue in the case discussed herein.
24. In fact, in Grant, the Court noted that not only had Barbara Grant's attending physician
determined that she was terminally ill, but four other physicians had agreed with that determination,
exceeding the minimum requirement of two disinterested physicians to confirm the prerequisite
attending physicians' diagnosis. Id. at 568, 747 P.2d at 457.
25. This is well illustrated by Hamlin, which did modify Colyer with regard to the need for
judicial involvement in the decisionmaking process. The court was explicit in making this
modification and provided elaborate reasoning for doing so. See Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 817-21,
689 P.2d at 1376-78.
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condition by a minimum of two disinterested, qualified physicians is
recognized in guidelines prepared by a panel of nationally prominent
judges and professors of law, medicine, and ethics to assist state courts in
handling cases involving termination of treatment.26 The Guidelines note
that "[s]ome states have also mandated that the medical
condition/prognosis of the patient be taken into account" prior to
withdrawal of life support, and recognize that Washington is among
those states.27 Further, the Guidelines recognize that some states,
including Washington, require confirmation of the diagnosis of the
prerequisite medical condition: "[A] series of state court opinions have
been issued requiring certification of the medical conclusions of the
treating physician by independent medical experts."2
26. Coordinating Council on Life-Sustaining Med. Treatment Decision Making by Courts, Nat'l
Center for State Courts, Guidelines for State Court Decision Making in Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment Cases 89-94 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Guidelines]. The Guidelines are funded by the
State Justice Institute.
27. Id. at 62 n.90 (citing Grant, Ingram, and Colyer). The Guidelines note: "Various courts have
ruled that certain medical requirements must be met prior to a determination t3 forgo [life support]."
Id. at 89 n.153.
28. Id. at 89-91 n.154 (citing Colyer, Hamlin, and Grant). It is clear that Colyer and Hamlin
require the patient to be irreversibly vegetative to permit withdrawal. When these cases were
decided, in 1983 and 1984 respectively, the term used to describe an irreversibly vegetative patient
was "persistent vegetative state." Recently, the term "persistent' has been refined by the medical
community to mean an extended, but not "permanent," vegetative state. The term "permanent
vegetative state" is now used to describe irreversible or permanent unconsciousness. Compare
Council on Scientific Affairs & Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Med. Assoc.,
Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support, 263 JAMA 426
(1990) [hereinafter AMA Council Report] with Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, MedicalAspects of
the Persistent Vegetative State (pts. I & 2), 330 New Eng. J. Med. 1499, 1572 (1994).
Regardless of the label employed, the Washington Supreme Court in both Colyer and Hamlin
emphasized that the patient's vegetative condition must be irreversible prior to withdrawal of life
support. It is hard to imagine how anyone could justify taking the life of someone who has not
personally requested such action and who will or might regain consciousne.s. Indeed, the Natural
Death Act, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.122.010-.920 (1996), specifies that life support can be
withdrawn from a vegetative patient only where the patient's state i,. one of "permanent
unconsciousness." See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.122.010-.030. Since the late 1980s, medical societies
have been in agreement that establishment of irreversibility requires a minimum period of
observation of the vegetative patient. That period is three to six months. This medical consensus was
reached after Colyer and Hamlin were decided. The American Medical &Asociation set forth its
policy regarding withdrawal of life support from vegetative patients in 1990, and established a three-
to six-month minimum period of observation of uninterrupted vegetative state behavior prior to
withdrawal. See AMA Council Report, supra. Both Colyer and Hamlin emphasize that irreversibility
must be established, thus, the principles established in those cases, when applied with modem
medical consensus, plainly require that this minimum waiting period e observed and that
permanency or irreversibility be established prior to withdrawing life support.
The defendants in the case discussed argued that because life support was withdrawn in Colyer
and Hamlin with less than three months of observed uninterrupted vegetative status, it was
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In this case, the plaintiffs pretrial motion for partial summary
judgment asked the trial court to rule that these minimum procedural
protections were indeed required and defined a minimum standard of
care. It was undisputed that they had not been provided. The trial court
denied this request.29
The trial judge subsequently refused to instruct the jury that state law
required certain minimum procedural protections be afforded patients
prior to withdrawal of their life support. The judge's actions left the jury
with no way of understanding that the doctors and hospital had failed to
afford the patient the minimum process held necessary by the state's
highest court. The jury had no way of knowing that life support had been
removed from a patient in a manner contrary to the law. A defense
verdict was returned and, as indicated above, the patient died before his
appeal could be considered.
The defense argued that it was constitutionally required to permit life-
support withdrawal from a patient who is neither terminally ill nor
permanently unconscious and is incompetent. This was plainly wrong as
a legal matter. In federal constitutional analysis, the patient's interest is
balanced against the state's.3" Where a patient is terminally ill or
permanently unconscious, the state's interest in preservation of life, as
considered against the patient's wishes, is substantially diminished.3'
Such a patient's interest in self-determination outweighs the state's
permissible to do so in this case. This reasoning ignores the emphasis in Colyer and Hamlin on
irreversibility, and the fact that medical consensus has since established a minimum three- to
six-month observation period.
Washington is not alone in requiring confirmation by a specified number of nontreating,
disinterested, qualified physicians. For example, the states of Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
and New Jersey also impose such a requirement. See Guidelines, supra note 26, at 89-91 n.153.
29. This was one of the trial court errors that could have been resolved on appeal had the appeal
not become moot due to the patients death.
30. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), revd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, No.
96-110, 1997 WL 348094 (U.S. June 26, 1997); see generally Thomas Win. Mayo,
Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die," 49 Md. L. Rev. 103, 104 n.7 (1990).
31. Preservation of life is one of the state interests asserted in cases involving end-of-life
decisionmaking. See, e.g., Mayo, supra note 30, at 110 n.39; In re Guardianship of Grant, 109
Wash. 2d 545, 556, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (1987), amended by 757 P.2d 534 (1988); Yale Kamisar,
When Is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When Is There No Constitutional "'Right to Live"?,
25 Ga. L. Rev. 1203, 1211 (1991) ("If death is unpreventable-if the best medical treatment
available can only postpone death for a short time-the interest in preserving life seems much
weaker."). That the state's interest in protecting and preserving life grows as the potential for life
increases is a basic tenet of reproductive rights jurisprudence, which permits greater state regulation
of abortion as the potential for life increases with advancing gestation. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at
833; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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interest. However, absent diminished life expectancy, the balance tips in
favor of the state. Where the patient is incompetent, an additional
substantial state interest comes into play: the protection of vulnerable
citizens from abuse.32
It is nonsense to suggest, as did the defense in this case, that the
Constitution requires withdrawal of life support from an incompetent but
non-terminal patient who has not been diagnosed as permanently
unconscious when a surrogate requests it. Indeed, in the federal
constitutional litigation asserting that competent terminal patients have
the right to choose death with physician assistance, the opponents argued
vociferously that to allow patient choice at all will lead inexorably down
a "slippery slope," at the bottom of which it would become permissible
to euthanize disabled persons, and that this must never be permitted.
Disturbingly, that is precisely what occurred here. In Compassion in
Dying v. Washington,33 the amicus curiae brief opposing assisted suicide
submitted by the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and
Disabled in the Ninth Circuit stated:
A constitutional right to assisted suicide cannot be confined to the
narrow category which the district court describes: i.e., competent
adults with terminal conditions who seek lethal help from
physicians. It will expand beyond these boundaries to include all
who are deemed to lack sufficient "quality of life," especially
people with disabilities, whether or not they have "terminal
conditions," and whether or not they are competent adalts.34
Similarly, the amicus curiae brief of the United States Catholic
Conference, another opponent of assisted suicide, stated:
Moreover, there is no reason to believe in this litigious society that
such a claimed right to assisted suicide can or will stop with the
terminally ill. As Justice Cardozo observed, any principle tends "to
32. See, e.g., Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 2021, 2034 (1992). The author states:
[W]hen considering the state's interest in preserving an individual's life in a suicide assistance
case, a court should find that, absent evidence of coercion or the patient's incompetence, the
state's interest is negligible compared with the patient's interest. However, if the patient is
incompetent or if other evidence calls into question the voluntariness of the patient's decision,
the state's interest in preserving life should be accorded substantial weight.
Id. (emphasis added).
33. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110,
1997 WL 348094 (U.S. June 26, 1997).
34. Brief Amicus Curiae of Julie L. Aardappel et al., in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 2,
Compassion in Dying (No. 94-35534).
Vol. 72:859, 1997
End of Life Decisionmaking
expand itself to the limit of its logic." Once any right to assisted
suicide is conceded for any class of persons, it will be difficult or
impossible to confine the right to that class. Since all medical
conditions can be placed on a continuum, any distinction will
simply be challenged as arbitrary. What criteria, for example, will
be used to distinguish the 80-year-old dying of cancer from the 70-
year-old with Alzheimer's disease, the 60-year-old with severe
depression and advanced leukemia, the 50-year-old depressed over
an unsuccessful business venture or the loss of a spouse, or the
incompetent of any age whose quality of life fails to meet someone
else's expectations? Anyone who doubts the reality of the slippery
slope should consider the Netherlands, where over a thousand
people a year are involuntarily euthanized 5
Another opponent of assisted suicide, the International Anti-
Euthanasia Task Force, argued in its brief:
If assisted suicide becomes just another "medical treatment" option,
no different under the law than withdrawing life-sustaining medical
treatment, then there is no logical manner, in light of the substituted
judgment cases, that assisted suicide, or more likely, euthanasia,
can ever be kept from being inflicted on incompetent persons who
cannot specifically request it."
The constitutional rebuttal to the slippery slope argument is that
competency and terminal illness are (relatively) bright lines that can be
drawn, and when the patient is both competent and terminal, the patient's
interests outweigh the state's.37 Correspondingly, when the patient is
35. Brief of the United States Catholic Conference et al., as Amid Curiae in Support of
Appellants State of Wash. etal. at 30-31, Compassion in Dying (No. 94-35534) (citations omitted).
36. Brief of the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants/Appellants' Brief at 30, Compassion in Dying (No. 94-35534); see also Note, supra note
32, at 2034 ("[S]ome opponents of physician-assisted suicide argue that permitting some assisted
suicides may lead to the killing of patients who want to live. This 'slippery slope' argument
expresses a utilitarian rationale for prohibiting suicide assistance."); Maria T. CeloCruz, Aid-in-
Dying: Should We Decriminalize Physician-A ssisted Suicide and Physician-Committed Euthanasia?,
18 Am. J.L. & Med. 369, 384 (1992) (reviewing slippery slope argument against legalizing
voluntary active euthanasia and danger that it would lead to "involuntary euthanizing of the
handicapped, incompetent, and others whose lives society considers not worth living").
37. This is the position taken by appellees in the Compassion litigation responding to this notion:
"The State's interest in preserving life is much greater in the case of a nonterminal individual. That
interest might well outweigh the nonterminal individual's interest in self-determination." Brief of
Appellees at 18 n.20, Compassion in Dying (No. 94-35534). As for extension of the constitutional
right claimed in the Compassion case to terminally ill, depressed patients who wish to hasten death
because of their depression, appellees therein do not advocate such extension, recognizing the
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incompetent and/or nonterminal, the state's interests prevail. Thus, in no
instance could the Constitution, even if it is read to permit expansion of
the rights of competent dying patients, require or permit the euthanizing
of incompetent, disabled persons, as the defendants in the case discussed
herein suggested is the current practice in Washington State.3"
What the defense claimed was acceptable current practice is in fact the
bottom of the slippery slope that both proponents and opponents of
expanding patient choice at the end of life agree should never be
countenanced.39
The defense sought to buttress their case by asserting that
Washington's surrogate prioritization statute4' altered the law established
in Colyer, Hamlin, and Grant. This legislation, however, is an extremely
specific and narrowly limited enactment that only identifies the order of
priority of familial relation for consent purposes, such as whether the
patient's spouse must be consulted versus the patient's parent.4! '
Moreover, Grant was decided in December 1987, after the enactment
of the prioritization statute, which became effective on July 26, 1987.42
Grant makes no mention of section 7.70.065 and, indeel, as pointed out
above, Grant required both a terminal diagnosis and confirmation by a
prognosis committee.
Indeed, this argument is entirely inconsistent with the Grant
framework, which permits withdrawal of life support at the request of a
surrogate only if all enumerated circumstances are present. The list of
circumstances requires, first, that the prerequisite medical condition be
diagnosed by the attending and two other qualified physicians. Next, the
greater state interests at stake: "[depressed patients] can be screened out -nd are not within the
category of mentally competent patients that this lawsuit addresses." Id. at 15 n.13.
38. This is true under either liberty or equal protection analysis. In the liberty analysis, as stated
above, the state's interests outweigh the patient's when the patient is nonterminal and incompetent.
For equal protection purposes, such patients are differently situated from terminal, competent
patients, and it is permissible to treat them differently. See generally Mayo, supra note 30, at 126-55
(analyzing whether Fourteenth Amendment protects right of patient in persistent vegetative state to
refuse life support and concluding it does not); Ira Mark Ellman, Cruzaa v. Harmon and the
Dangerous Claim That Others Can Exercise An Incapacitated Patient's Right To Die, 29 Jurimetrics
J. 389,394-99 (1989).
39. As noted by Professor Yale Kamisar, in the case of a nonterminal pelient: "[rio say that a
person who can be kept alive for many years should have her life support disconnected because she
is 'better off dead' or 'might as well be dead' . . . is to grapple with 'the hopelessly elusive question
of a life not worth living."' Kamisar, supra note 31, at 1212.
40. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70.065 (1996).
41. The legislative history of the surrogate prioritization statute reveals no reference to this
legislation's alleged intent to eliminate or alter the common law's important patient protections.
42. Act of July 26, 1987, ch. 162, § 1, 1987 Wash. Laws 544-45.
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surrogate is to apply substituted judgment, that is, determine whether the
patient would, if able, choose to direct the withdrawal of treatment. If
such a determination cannot be made, the surrogate then determines
whether withdrawal would be in the patient's best interest.43 If, as
defendants contended, the surrogate prioritization statute eliminated the
need for the first step in the process (the diagnosis and confirmation of a
prerequisite medical condition), the Grant court would not have set out
the elaborate framework that it did. The fact that it did, notwithstanding
that section 7.70.065 was then in effect, clearly indicates that the
surrogate prioritization legislation did not implicitly supersede the
common law requirements of Colyer, Hamlin, and Grant.
IV. CONCLUSION
Of interest to all physicians, attorneys, and others grappling with the
issue of withdrawal of life support at the direction of a surrogate is the
chasm, revealed by the case discussed herein, between what the law
requires and what mainstream medical providers are in fact doing. In the
trial of this case, the defense introduced testimony of expert physicians,
including prominent faculty members of a leading university medical
school, who testified that it was accepted practice to accommodate
surrogate requests for withdrawal of life support regardless of whether
the patient was either terminally ill or permanently unconscious as
determined by a minimum number of qualified physicians. This
disturbing divergence between practice and law no doubt exists in other
states, not just Washington.
Where a state court of last resort has established certain minimum
procedural protections that must be afforded patients prior to the
withdrawal of life support at the direction of a surrogate, those
procedures should be followed by medical providers. The medical
community may do more, but it should never do less.
43. See In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 566-67, 747 P.2d 445, 456-57 (1987),
amended by 757 P.2d 534 (1988).

